Beyond Populist Fixes: A Smarter Path to Stability in Nepal’s Democracy
Nepal’s dramatic Himalayan landscape belies a political turmoil marked by frequent leadership changes. Since the end of the monarchy in 2008, Nepal has cycled through governments at a breakneck pace 14 different prime ministers in 16 years. This chronic instability frustrates voters and fuels demands for change. In recent youth-led “Gen Z” protests (2025), demonstrators even used online platforms (e.g. Discord) to symbolically select an interim leader. These populist actions underscore deep dissatisfaction with the status quo and have intensified calls to reform how Nepal chooses its executive. In particular, some advocate directly electing the prime minister by popular vote. At first glance this seems democratic and stable, but a closer analysis drawing on Nepal’s experience and international examples reveals serious downsides on both fronts.
The Parliamentary Framework in Nepal Today Nepal’s 2015 Constitution establishes a parliamentary republic: the executive power rests with a Council of Ministers headed by a prime minister who must enjoy the confidence of the legislature. By law, “the President is to appoint the parliamentary party leader of the political party with the majority in the House of Representatives as the Prime Minister”. In practice, this means that after each election parties negotiate coalitions to command a majority.
Figure 1 illustrates a fully elected legislature (Canada’s Parliament) where the prime minister is chosen by legislators. This ensures the cabinet has legislative support, but in Nepal’s multi-party system it has also meant shifting alliances and fragile coalitions.
Parliamentary democracies (e.g. Canada’s capital) formally vest government formation in the legislature. In Nepal, however, no single party often wins a majority, so leaders must cobble together coalitions. Frequent party realignments have led to governments that last only months.
In recent years Nepal’s coalition politics have been highly volatile. For example, the Communist leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) secured the prime ministership by alliances with the Nepali Congress, but lost support after less than 18 months. Within a fortnight, his former ally KP Sharma Oli returned as PM by forming a new coalition. Such turnover five confidence votes in three years in Dahal’s case is now routine. In July 2024 Nepal appointed its 14th prime minister since 2008. The constant re-shuffling frustrates policy continuity and can stall legislation and budgets. Observers note that even Beijing and New Delhi closely watch and influence Nepali coalition-building for their own interests, underscoring how tenuous weak coalitions leave the country. In sum, while Nepal’s parliamentary constitution enshrines representation, the multi-party reality has produced “a complex political maze” of ever-changing governments.
Pitfalls of a Directly-Elected Prime Minister
In reaction to this chaos, many Nepalis urge “taking democracy to the people” by electing the prime minister directly, bypassing coalitions. Proponents argue a nationwide election would produce a clear winner and stronger executive. Indeed, leaders from several parties – from the UML to the Rastriya Prajatantra Party – have included direct-election agendas in their manifestos. Italy’s recent experience (2023) illustrates this impulse: Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni proposed a constitutional reform whereby electoral coalitions would also field a PM candidate on ballots, aiming to “give stability” by tying the executive to voter mandates.
However, practical and theoretical problems abound with a directly-elected head of government. First is the representation dilemma: in a multi-candidate race, a popular vote winner could take office with only a plurality. For example, if four candidates earn 36%, 24%, 22% and 18% of the vote respectively, the 36% candidate becomes PM even though 64% of voters preferred someone else. This means most citizens would feel unrepresented – the very opposite of a “majority” mandate. International experience confirms such fears. The Annapurna Express notes that the only modern case of a directly elected prime minister was Israel (1996–2001), which abandoned the experiment after voters split tickets: people voted for local legislators and a separate PM candidate, often ending up with a minority premier who could not enact policy. The result in Israel was greater fragmentation and gridlock defeating the stability the reform aimed to produce.
Second, direct elections tend to spur populism and personality politics. When citizens vote for an individual rather than a party list, campaigns become centered on personal charisma or slogans, not policy. As one political scientist observes, voters use a politician’s personal image to infer their platform (an effect especially pronounced with populist figures). In Nepal, where party loyalties are already fluid, a directly elected PM might campaign on vague promises to override the messy parties below. Analysts warn this could worsen authoritarian tendencies. For instance, Kathmandu Post political scientists argue that Nepali leaders who already sometimes bypass parliament (as Dahal did) would only become more autocratic if they had the direct popular legitimacy of a head of state. Lok Raj Baral – once a supporter of a directly elected executive now concedes that such a system “cannot stop a directly elected executive from taking a dictatorial path”.
Finally, a directly-elected PM could be parliamentarily crippled if his party lacks a legislative majority. Imagine a PM winning 40% of the vote nationally, but his party only wins 20% of seats. He would face a hostile legislature, with the risk of constant gridlock or attempted impeachments. This conflict between separate mandates is seen in semi-presidential systems (like France or Sri Lanka), and often leads to repeated constitutional crises. In short, direct election does not guarantee effectiveness. It can even lead to deadlocks worse than now, or to demands for extra powers to break stalemates. Given these serious trade-offs, many experts caution against a directly-elected Nepali PM.
The Limits of Nepal’s Coalition Politics
In practice, this has hurt Nepal’s governance. Frequent government changes have stalled development projects and budget laws. (For example, a coalition that served only 11 days in 2023 struggled to pass any legislation.) Foreign observers note that chronic instability “makes it almost impossible for any party to achieve a clear mandate to form the government”. Economic growth has lagged as ministries change hands or priorities shift. Moreover, constant uncertainty discourages investment, compounding stagnation. Even citizens feel disillusioned; a growing share of Nepalis, especially among urban youth, see current politics as “transactional” and driven by personalism rather than serving the national interest.
There have been many attempts to reform the parliamentary system without abandoning it altogether. Nepal’s civil society and media often argue for stronger party discipline, anti-defection laws, or thresholds to ensure coalitions have a genuine majority. However, no quick constitutional fix has emerged. The current debate thus seeks a compromise: keeping the spirit of parliamentary democracy (majority support, collective decision-making) while adding safeguards to reduce the churn.
A Hybrid Approach: Fixed-Term Coalition with Guaranteed Stability
A promising proposal is a middle-ground “hybrid” system that blends direct accountability with parliamentary majority rule. The core idea is to give voters and parties a say in the executive, but to lock in a minimum period of stability. One such design could include the following features:
Majority-Elected Prime Minister.
The prime minister would still be chosen by the House of Representatives, but only if he or she commands the support of a majority (at least 51%) of all members, not just those present. This ensures the government truly reflects over half the parliament, binding coalitions from the outset.
Initial Term Immunity.
Once appointed, the prime minister would enjoy a fixed tenure of 3 years during which no vote of no confidence or vote of confidence can be tabled. This grace period would allow the government to implement policies without fear of immediate collapse. It is similar in spirit to minority “fixed-term” laws seen in some European parliaments, though here the immunity is constitutionally guaranteed.
Strong Impeachment Threshold.
To balance immunity, a powerful impeachment mechanism could be introduced. For example, if one-quarter of parliament members (e.g. 69 MPs) jointly petition, they could initiate impeachment proceedings. If then two-thirds of the full parliament support it, the prime minister would be removed and replaced. This high bar (2/3) ensures removal only for serious issues, preventing casual backstabbing while preserving ultimate accountability.
Mid-term Confidence Check.
At the 3½-year mark, the prime minister would automatically face a confidence vote. If he/she fails to secure the support of one-third of MPs, the prime minister must resign. In that case, parliament would elect a successor to serve the remaining 1½ years. This mechanism (inspired by stability norms in India or South Korea) forces a halfway review of the government’s popularity without allowing an opposition to collapse it on a whim.
Fixed 5-Year Term for Legislature.
Finally, the House of Representatives and the executive would serve a fixed 5-year term (unless dissolved for misconduct), with general elections at term end. This synchronizes the electoral and governmental cycle, eliminating premature dissolutions and giving each government a clear timeframe.
Taken together, these rules could guarantee both stability and representation. A prime minister would be assured of at least 3 years to govern (longer than many past Nepali governments), fulfilling voters’ mandate. Yet the combination of majority election, strong impeachment, and mid-term review would keep the executive answerable to the legislature and people. In effect, at least half the parliamentarians (and by extension, a proportional slice of voters) would continuously back the government. This design draws lessons from other democracies: for instance, many parliamentary countries require “constructive” no-confidence (only against a PM who has already lost majority) or have fixed terms to curb instability.
Importantly, this hybrid model preserves Nepal’s basic constitutional character. It does not make the prime minister directly elected by the public, nor does it eliminate coalitions. Instead it rebalances incentives: smaller parties know they cannot topple a government for minor reasons (thanks to the immunity and high impeachment bar), so they must negotiate responsibly. Meanwhile, the public retains the power to replace the legislature (and thus indirectly the executive) every five years. In effect, this could achieve the populist goal of “stronger government” while keeping the democratic principle that the executive depends on legislative support.
Constitutional and Comparative Context
Constitutional change in Nepal is challenging: any amendment to the form of government would require a two-thirds majority in a joint session of parliament (or a referendum). Moreover, many senior politicians and analysts have defended the current framework as best-suited to Nepal. For example, leading lawyer Lok Raj Baral now urges strengthening the existing system rather than scrapping it. Federalism, proportional representation, and inclusionary quotas in the 2015 constitution were hard-won reforms reflecting diverse aspirations. Any new model must respect these commitments to inclusion and unity.
We can also draw on comparative examples. As noted, Israel abandoned direct-PM elections after one cycle. Italy is now debating a similar issue: Meloni’s proposal to directly elect the Italian prime minister is controversial even there, as opponents warn it could weaken checks and balances. More broadly, stable democracies like Germany, India and Japan maintain parliamentary selection of the executive. Germany’s constructive vote of no-confidence (only allowing ousting a chancellor if a replacement is agreed) is one stability device. India guarantees a fixed term for its prime minister unless a majority falls, and has seen few early collapses. Drawing on these, Nepal’s hybrid proposal sits within a global spectrum of parliamentary innovations aimed at reconciling majority rule with stability.
Conclusion: Beyond Populist Fixes
Calls to directly elect Nepal’s prime minister are understandable as frustrations grow. But as experts stress, every system has trade-offs. The challenge is to design institutions that reflect Nepal’s unique needs: a multi-ethnic, multi-party democracy struggling with both polarization and demotivation. A sudden shift to a direct-election model risks replacing one set of problems (coalition squabbles) with others (minority rule and demagoguery). By contrast, a carefully reformed parliamentary approach – as outlined above – could address Nepalis’ demands for effective governance without sacrificing proportionality and accountability.
An open national dialogue involving all parties, civil society and voters is now essential. Any major reform should be based on research and consensus, not only on slogans. Ultimately, Nepal’s goal must be to enhance the legitimacy of government while preserving inclusiveness. A mixed system that binds a majority-supported prime minister to a fixed term (with safeguards for oversight) appears to offer that balance. In this way, Nepal can strengthen its democracy and stability together, rather than chasing a quick fix that might prove as divisive as the problem it intends to solve.
Sources: Nepal’s constitution and governance structure; reports on Nepal’s frequent government changes; analyses of direct executive elections and parliamentary systems; news reports on Nepal’s recent political events.
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